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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
1'!-IFJ OIL SHALE CORPORATION,
a Nevada Corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

-vs.Y. LARSON, also known as
FREDERICK Y. LARSON,
I~'l'HEL R. LARSON, Husband and
Wif P; FREDgRICK H. LARSON
and DOROTHY H. LARSON,
Husband and Wife.

FRI~D

Case
No.10887

Defendants-Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF
I.

REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS I. A.
AND E.
A.

Defendants arc Precl11ded from Advancing Two
Totally Contradictory Po8itions on Appeal.

DPfendants answerPd plaintiff's Amended Complaint
as follows:
By the instrument referred to as Exhibit A
[Agreement of July 25] in the complaint and
certain oral understandings between defendants
and plaintiff, the defendants granted the plaintiff
1

an option for a period of six months ... In cou.
sideration of said option the plaintiff paid defend
ants the total sum of $20,000.00.
At the start of the trial defendants abandoned their
pleadings and took the opposite position that there wai
no option contract. (See Plaintiff's Brief, p. 42). At
the close of trial defendants proposed Findings and Con.
clnsions reciting that there was no contract; these Findings and Conclusions were entered by the court.
Upon rehearing on November 18, 1966, the trial conrt
informed defendants that the Findings and Conclusions
they had submitted and which had been entered by the
court were contrary to the judgment of the court. At this
hearing the trial court demanded that defendant take onr
position or the other (See Tr-2, pp. 21-23). Whereupon
the following discourse took place :
THE COURT: Now this has been going on
a long time. Yon better both be prepared, .von
and all of your counsel, and it is true of the otlt~r
side.
I want to know whether or not your position
now is that there was such an agreement, that i'
by their conduct, that then~ was such an agreement
and that th(~y failed to act within that time.
MR. JENSEN: I think that this'l'HE COURT: Because this case has ber·n
decided upon that theory. (Tr.-2, pp. 37, 38)

*

*

•

THE COURT: 'Vell, I suggest that you argue
here in support of the position taken by your own
client, to the effect that there was an option agree2

lllf'nt and that it PXpin•d on .January 15th, and lH·
was entitled to his $20,000.00. (Tr-2, p. 41)

• • •

THJ<J COUR'r: T think it is ratlwr }>Pculiar
1wople to come in and argtw tlwrP was no
option wlwn your client mys then• was an option
and testified accordingly. (Tr-2, p. 41)
f'or

,'\OU

• • •

'l'HE COl'RT: If I can't rely upon the testimony of :rnur client.
MR. .JENSEN: TherP is not an)· question
about it.
THE COURT: Tlwn there ought to be a
rPview of my decision.
MR. .JENSEN: There is no question about
it, )·ou can rely on him, that is his position, that
is the position of both parties that there was an
option. ... (Tr-2, p. 42) (Emphasis supplied)

• • •

Subsequent to this !waring defendants adopted the
position that there was a valid binding contract and submitted the revised Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law whieh are the subject of this appeal. These Findings
n•cite that there was a valid and binding option agreement between the parties snfficient to sustain the $20,000 consideration paid by plaintiff to the defendants.
Now, on appeal, defendants not only argue in support
of their position as found by tlw trial court but argue
th<> opposite position which they were forced by the court
to abandon as U'Pll. These inconsistent and diametrically
oppos<>d positions can be summarized as follows:
(1) That the July 25 letter alone is critically
dPficient; and
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(2) That the July 25 letter, supplemented by the

three oral agreements found by the trial court
suddPnly beconws a fnlly Pnforeeahle contra('('.

The defendants contend, on page 9 of their brief,
that at least "three critical and essential matters" arp
not covered by the July 25 agreement. The difficulty with
this argument is that the matters said to be critically
omitted from the July 25 writing are nowhere suppli~d
by any alleged oral understandings.
Such oral understandings, as found hy the trial comt,
related only to: (1) the commencement date of the
TOSCO-Larson employment contract; (2) an agrPenwnt
to negotiate further details; and (3) the cornrnencPmrnt
date of the option. As pointed out in plaintiff's brif·f,
the first term is not relevant to the controversy, and
the other two terms are expressly covered by the .Jnly
25 writing.
The defendants argue on the one hand that the Jnly
25 agreement is not complete with respect to their duty
to perform thereunder, and on the other hand that such
agreement is complete with respect to their right to n·tain the $20,000.00 paid by TOSCO. This they cannot do.
See, e.g. Osborn v. Kington, 148 Kan. 314, 80 P.2d 1063
(1938).
Since defendants rely on the ver.'T written contract
plaintiff seeks to have enforced, the only question for
decision is whether that written contract governs tlw
commencement date of the six-months option period.

4

B.

A Preliminary Agreement, When Acted V pon
l!y the Parties, Co11stit11t<'s a Binding Contract.

DPfrndants argue that if the July 25 agreement is
..
n·I:·
a pn~liminary agreement, tlw parties are not
111
honnd tlwrP!Jy. \Ylwn parties mutually agree on the
tenns of a contract, they may be bound by such preliminar.' agrP<>lllPnt PYen if formal documents setting forth
th(• tPrms in detail are not subsequently signed. SeP
Smith r. Onyx Oil & Chemical Co., 218 F.2d 104 (3rd Cir.
1955) ; 1 Williston, Contracts, §§28, 28A. This is true even
if t!JP original agreement is not reduced to writing. See,
e.g., Comerata v. Chaumont Co., 52 N.J. Super. 299,
145 A.2d 471 (1958); American Aero Corp. v. Grwnd
C'eiltrrtl Aircraft Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 69, 317 P.2d 694.
'rl1Ps(• anthorities hold that the subsequent conduct of the
parties may be such as to bind the parties to the terms
agreed upon in the preliminary agreement. See Corbin,
Contracts, §101. Here, the parties reached a preliminary
agreP11wnt on .Tnly 25, 19G3, and their subsequent conduct and the• formal agrPernents (Appendix B of Appellants Brief) affirmed the agreements reduced to writing
at that timP.
fn the case of D.A.C. Uranium Co. v. Benton, (D.
Colo. 1156) 149 F. Supp. 667, the parties entered into a
pn•liminar.'" agreement for the lease of mining claims.
When tlw LPssor refnsPd to sign the formal lease agreen11·nts later pn•pared, the LesseP brought suit. Thus the
fads arP practical!.'· identical to the case at hand. The
<·mirt SJH•cifically enforced the following agreement:

5

Victor C. Herlacher (leasec) and Richard Brady
and Robert Benton (Ieasors).
l. Leasors to retain :'>'?~ rnyalty on nd 111ill
rdurns and 5% of all bonus Pxeept frpight h0111 1,,

2.

Leason; to n·tain tlw dP\'(')opuwnt bonus.

3. If Ow pereentage of ore increases in rnlui·
ahove original shiprnPnt, IPasors are to rPtain
10% after the first year.
1/3

4. Leasf' to contimw indPfinitPly as long- as
it eontinnes six months of each year.
5. This agreement eoneerns all mining elai1u'
situated in Section No. 11, Township No. 47, Ha11.~"
No. 11, FrPmont Connt~-. This [tlll'sP J claims a1·1·
known as the lightning gronp."
In comparison with tlw above s1wcifically enforceahlf~
agreement, the July 25 AgrPement would appear to ht> a
"formal contract" in and of itself.
C.

Plaintiff Seeks Sp('cific Performanct' of the J11l,11
25 Agreement.

In Argument I.E. of their brief, defendants contend
that plaintiff seeks to have the court create a contract
between the parties which does not conform to the July
25 agreement.

Plaintiff vigorously rejects the proposition that it
seeks specific performance of any contract other than
the July 25 agreement. Defendants do not deny the
terms that are embodied in the appendices to plaintiff's
brief. They could hardly do so, inasmuch as they signe<l
the July 25 agreement and prepared the drafts embodied
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in the appendices. Rather, defendants confuse the issue
by ref erring to draft documents prepared in February
of 1964. These later drafts were obviously designed
for <lis<'11ssion purposes only, not for execution. Portions
, 1·:·n· p11rposPfull~, underlined as departures from earlier
(lrafts. N"o "refusal to sign" the February drafts led to
tliis lawsuit. Rather, Larson's disavowal of his obligation
to sign an~· formal documenh; under the .July 25 agree11wnt forced plaintiff to seek judicial enforcement of such
agTee111Pnt. Defendants' detailed criticisms of the Februan· drafts are not relevant.
Tlw cases relif'd on b~v dPfendants for their statement
that the court ''has consistently refused to supply missi11g elements of a contract" are also not in point. Price
r. Uoyd, 31 Utah SG, SG Pac. 767 (1906) and Hargreaves
r. H11rto11, 59 Utah 575, 20G Pac. 262 (1922) deal with the
doctrine· of part performance and the statute of frauds
in rf'lation to alleg(•d parol gifts of realty. Pitcher v.
J,uurit:rn, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967) was df'eid0d on the basis of mutual abandonment of an original
oral contract. Defendants cannot, of course, rely on plaintiff's performance, and the attempt to establish an oral
contract differing from the provisions of the July 25
agreeuwnt Yiolates the statute of frauds as well as the
parol eYidence rule.
The court is not ask1c•d to make a new contract betwPPn thf' partit>s. As stafrd in thf' July 25 agreement,
tlw purpose of that lf'tter was to
statP tlw intention of TOSCO and the shareholders
of Larson Oil Co., as modified on July 24, to here-
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aftPr Pnter into contracts and agn'PlllPnts gi\'iug
exprPssion to thosP undt>rstandings as th<•.\ pertain
to the holdings of Larson Oil Co. (Emphasis
supplied)
'l'he contracts and agrPPmPnh; r(:'ferred to abow
did come into existenc(:' on December 13, 1963. D<drndants' only witnPss, Fred V. Larson, stated in regard to
these contracts:
Q. (By Mr. Dufford) Mr. Larson, in n·sponse to questions asked by }Jlaintiff's connsPl
yon stated that the documents identified as plaintiff's l!Jxhibits No. 4 arnl 5, lAppPndix B of plaintiff's briPf], I beliPve ~-on statt>d wel'l' complr-fe
in all respects at the time they were transmith·d
to tlw plaintiff?
A. That is correct, that is what I stated.
(Tr-1, p. 50) (Emphasis supplied)

Tht> only provisions contained in plaintiff's appt>ndices which differ from Dufford's draft of DecPmlwr 13,
are, as admitted by dPfendants' counsel, supplied by the
.July 25 agrePment. (See Plaintiff's Brief, page 18; Tr-3,
p.p. 46, 47)
Defendants either prepared or agreed to every word
in the documents attached as plaintiff's appendices. The
court is not asked to supply a single word, but merely to
order the enforcement of the written contract behn•en
the parties which is in existence and before the court. In
the case of Johnson v. Jones, 109 Utah 92, 164 P.2d 893
( 1946), this court specifically Pnforced a similar preliminary agreement under similar circumstances.
As this court stated in Cummings v. Nielson, 32 Utah
8

1m. 120 Pac. Gl9 (1912), ·'equity regards that as certain
irhich ma~· be made certain." All details were supplied,
as int<-rnkd by the parties, in the revisions of the Tweedy
rlraft pn·1iarPd by Larson and Dufford in DPcember,
1!J(;:i. 'rlH•se documents clParl~· evidenc<• tht• intention
of tlw partiPs and became part and parcel of the contract
lwl\l"PPn the parties. As noted by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Miller v. Gordon, 296 Ill. 346, 129 N.E. 809
(19:21), a part>' cannot conq)lain when a contract he him;.;Plf pn•parcd is enforced against him.

l r. REf'LY '1'0 DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT I. B.
There is No Legal Doctrine of "Subsequent Confirm-

r1tion"' of a Prior Invalid Orn! Agreement, and the

R1.·idcnce Does Not Si1pport the Finding of an Oral
Optio11 different from the July 25 agreement.

DPf Pndants' position, set ont on page 19 of their
hrief, is nnknmvn at common law. Defendants do not
claim that at some time after July 25, 1963 the parties
agreed to modify the writing of that date. They do not
rlaim that they relied to their detriment upon some new
oral agreement, or that a novation transpired. (See
Tr-3, p. 31) Defendants simply state that the prior oral
a.l('rrement was somehow "confirmed" after July 25 and,
in somp mysterious fashion, unknown at common law,
it superseded the intervening written agreements of
that elate. There is, of course, no authority for the
proposition that conduct subsequent to a written signed
liy rill the parties can "confirm" an alleged oral contract
which huth predates the writing and conflicts with the
termR of said writing.
9

Begilliling at page 19 of their brief, defendants set
forth eleven paragraphs purporting to recite evidence
"conclusively" supporting this novel theory of "subsequent confirmation.''
Paragraph 1, in the first place, is not evidence of
"subsequent confirmation." Secondly, the statement that
"Larson testified that this was a clear understanding of
the parties on July 11, and ,July 25, 1963" is in no way
substantiated by the three references to the trial transcript there cited. All three references merely suggPst
on July 11 1963, Larson Oil Company and TOSCO preliminarily agreed that the option should commence on
July 15.
Defendants' reference in paragraph 2 to Larson's
employment by TOSCO is no evidence whatsoever that
both parties confirmed the prior oral agreement subsequent to the July 25 agreement. Paragraphs 3, 4, and
5 refer to drafts of options and leases prepared by
Tweedy and Dufford at various dates. As noted at page
27 of plaintiff's brief, dates used in draft documents cannot be considered evidence as to the commencement date
of an option period. Moody v. Smith, 9 Utah 2d 139, 340
P.2d 83 (1959). The Tweedy drafts of July 18 are not
subsequent to July 25; the dates used by Dufford on December 13 in no way reflect TOSCO'S position at any
time; and defendants' thesis leads to the absurd conclu·
sion that in February of 1964 TOSCO was attempting
to secure Larson's execution of an agreement which
TOSCO "clearly understood" had already expired.
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'!'he letter dated August 3, 1963 from Koolsbergen
to Larson, reft>rred to in paragraph G (Def. Exhibit 24),
has no reference whatsoever to any option period. It
obviously rt>frrs to the July 25 agreement, and in no way
indicates that TOSCO considered the option period to
have begun. Similarly, the memoranda of Larson partial1)' set forth in paragraph 7 do not refer to any option
period. They merely indicate that Larson was anxious
to gd tlw formal documents signed and to receive his
$20,000 upon such event, as provided by the terms of the
July 25 agreement. They also indicate that Larson was
looking forward to .January 15, 1964 as the date of exercise of the option, at which time he would be entitled to
5000 shares of TOSCO stock.
'l'lw words on the checks issued by TOSCO, and
the letter from TOSCO's treasurer (Par. 10) by no stretch
of the imagination imply anything but a course of action
on tht· iiart of TOSCO in complete conformity with the
writt<>n agreement. There is no reference to option period
dates whatsoever. "Winston's statement of March 23,
19fi5 (Par. 11) is simply an identifying reference to the
unsigned draft documents. If this is evidence of TOSCO's
"clear understanding", there would have been no point
in di~cussing the "rights and dnties" of the parties under
an agreE•rnent which "TOSCO understood had expired"
two months earlier.
Paragraph S refers to Larson's hearsay account of
his telPphone conversation with Lenhart on January 14,
10G4, j11st one day before the alleged expiration date. The
rPasons for Len hart's ignorance of the mattff are ex11

plained on page 27 of plaintiff's brief. Paragraph 10 re.
fers to a self ~wrving lettPr written h~- Larson to th,.
accountants who were auditing TONCO's books in late
January, 1964. 'l'hus out of 11 paragraphs of so-caUed
"evidPnce" only two, varagraphs 8 and 9, so much ao
snggPst a conmwnC('!llPnt dat<> of thP option iwriod differing from that pro\·idPd in th<· .J 11!~- 25 agrPPlllPnt. BotJ 1
of those paragraphs rl'fer to sPlf-serving statements b>·
Larson himself attPmping to eonYPY his hPlief that tlir•
commencement of the option i1eriod differed from the
time provided in the Jnly 25 agre<"lllent. The first attempt occurred the day before the al!PgPd option iwriod
was to expire; the othPr occurred sornetiuw af t<·nrnnl.
No n·iden<'e whatsoever is advanced tPnding to prove
that prior to January 14, 1964 TOSCO was en'n aware
of Larson's belief that the option period expired on
January 15, let alone that TOSCO ever agreed to or
acquiesced in such belit>f. The <c~Yidence of 'l'OSCO'S
actions set out in sections B.2. and B.5. of plaintiff's lirid
clearly proves that TOSCO at all times relied on the clear
and express provisions of the ,Jn[~- 25, 1963 written agreement.
III. REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT I.C.
A.

flf'fendants are Precl11ded from Making the
Arguments Set Forth in Section J.C. of Tl1ci1
Brief Because Such Arguments are Co11tradictory to Defendants' Position. Below.

At trial dt>f Pndants urgPd upon tlw court the theory
that the writtPn agrPement of .July 25 was subsequently
modified to provide for tlw allegt>d July 15 to January
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1:-i option IH'rformanc~~ dates. The trial court's decision
to admit parol evidenc<> over plaintiff's objection was
bas<'d upon that theory. (Tr-3, p. 3G) The defendants
now abandon their trial theory of subsequent oral modifir-ation, sinee there is no evidence to that effect, and urge
Pntin·ly different theories upon this court which were
never presented to the trial court.

The following excerpts from the transcript of No18, 19G6 reflect the posititon taken by the defend;rnts at the time of trial:

n~mhPr

MR. DUFFORD: ... We have no question
at all, had the lawsuit started ten days after that
July 25 nwmo, that no Pvidence could have been
introduced to show that there was an oral term to
that option, contrary to what the written docnlllPnts said . . . . (Tr-3, p. 31)
* * *
MR. DUFFOR.D: Initially, the agreement
said that they would-'rosco would pa:-.' the $20,000.00 whPn the formal agreements were executed.
'l'h<•n• is no question hut what the parties felt this
wonld he within a relatinly short period of ti1m•,
after July 25. (Tr-3, p. 33)
1'HE COUR'r: What is your answer to that
elaim that it could not he possible because of the
:-1tatnte of Frauds, and because of the Parol Evidence Rule.
MR. ASHTON: And merger of agreements.
1\fR. DUFFORD: The rebuttal to that, your
!Ionor, I believe is this. We concede, that an oral
option is unenforceable unless subsequent acts of
the parties, rPliance upon the facts that there is
an nnpnforceable agrePment to begin with, the
snhs<:>(pwnt actions of thP parties, may be to their
rletrime11t in such a wa~Y that they can breath life
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in to an otlwrwise enforceablP (sic) oral contraet.
That is what happened here. (1-1 r-3, p. :34) (F,rn_
phasis snpplied.)
* * *
THE COURT: That's trnP if th<> <'vicl<>n<••·
justifies that conclusion in light of thP law thn
brought to m:· atenttion. I am ref erring to th~
Statute of Frauds and the Parol Evidence Rule.
MR. DUFFORD:
that

Yes Sir.

THE COURT: Did the Court error (sic) in
respect~

MR. DUFFORD: Not in the least so far a'
we are concerned, :·on did not error (sic).
The Court didn't error (sic) and then· was
no variance of a written agreement by parol teo:timony in this case. Bnt any written contract can
be amendt-d, modified, changed or altered as much
as people desire subject (sic) to its execution.
If those changes are made b:· parol or oral chang!'
after the exc>cntion of the agreement, and that is
what lWJJpcned in this case. July 25, they said Wf'
are going to . . .
1'HE COURT: Do yon claim there was a
novation?
MR. DUFFORD: Not a novation, an amendment of the basic contract, some of the terms of
the basic contract, and a waiver of certain reqnirf'ments. (1'r-3, pp. 35, 36) (Emphasis supplied.)
Defendants argued to the trial court that there
was ~n oral modification of the writing after the .July
25, 1963 written agreement had been signed, and that
defendants had relied, to their detriment, upon this alleged snhseqnent oral modification. This was the only
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way 111 which they could avoid the parol evidence rule,
llw doetrim' of merger and the statute of frauds.
Defendants do not advance their theory of subsequent oral modification on appeal because there is no
eYidt>n<'P in the record to support it. Yet that was the
onl>· theory upon which the trial court conld have based
its decision since it was the only theory proffered at
trial. Defendants are therefore precluded from urging
the four totally new and inconsistent theories presented
in Argument I.C. for the first time on appeal by the
established rules of estoppel. One rule is stated in 5 CJS
.:\ ppeal and Error, §1503:
The general rule is that a person cannot
try his case on one theory in the trial court and
on another theory in a court of review. \Vhether
the result in the trial court is in his favor or
against him and this is the rule both in law and
t>quity.... hence a party is estopped to urge on
appt>al or t>rror any error growing out of the trial
submission or decision of the cause or of any
quPstion therein upon an incorrect theory when
snch theory was of his own selection or when such
thPory was adopted by the trial court at his r£>quest.
Wht>n a party relies in the trial court on a
cPrtain ground or theory of action or defense he
is honnd thereby and will not be allowed in the
ap1wllate court to assume or adopt any position
or attitude which is inconsistent therewith or to
shift, changP or abandon his theory or cont<>ntions
nor ·will he be heard to question the propriety or
the validitv of his coursP in that behalf nor mav
he enlarge. his theory of recovery. The rule applit>s to a party who has tried his case wholly or in
part on a certain theory.
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This court has ado11t<·d and affirnwd t}w abow ru[(,,
In Erans v. Shand, 74 "Gtah 451, 280 Pac. 239 (1929) thi 8
court stated:
''The appellant in her reply ... asserts that
the rPspondent is hound by the theory of his all(·gations and of the findings and may not now on
appeal from the judgment founded thereon depart
therefrom. vVe think the contention is well founded. The rule is well sPttled that on appeal th1·
parties are restricted to the theor~- on which th"
case was prosecuted or defendPd in th<' comt
below."
See also, Obradovich v. Walker Bros. Bankers, 80
Utah 587, 16 P.2d 212 (1932), affirming the Evans rule.

B.

Thrre is No Issue as to the Execution Date of
the Contract.

There has never been a question as to the date of
execution of the July 25 agreement. The agreement was
dated July 25, 1963, and executed July 26, 1963. Defendants attempt to justify the admission of parol evidence
on the ground that such evidence "in effect" shO\n.; a
''different'' effective datP. This was not the purpose of
the introduction of parol evidence at the trial. Moreover,
the cases cited as supporting their position, General 111sttrance Co. v. Henich, 13 Utah 2d 231, 371 P.2d 642
(1962), and Olsen v. Reese, 114 Utah 411, 200 P.2d n3
(1948), nwrely hold that ·when a c1uestion arisPs as to
\d1ether the date specified in a contract is the actual
date the contract \Yas signed, parol eYidence can be introduced to clarif~' that point. The date of execution is not
in question here, and parol eYidence is not admissihlP to
Yary the terms of the Jul~- 25 agreement.
16

C.

'J'he July :25 A.qre1'mcnt is a F?tll or Prtrtial Integration.

lkfendants contend that the July 25 agreement is
llll'rel~' a ll'tkr of intent, and that parol evidence is admissible to show that the option period ran from July
lf), 1963 th rough January 15, 1964. They argue that the
terms specifically agreed upon in the July 25 agreement
may be varied or contradicted by parol evidence. In citing
Section 228( a) of the Restatement, Contracts, they ignore
ot!H·r relevant portions of the Restatement. Section 232,
!'ntitlt>d "Standard of Interpretation Application to Integration of Part of an Agreement," states as follows:
\Yhere part of an agreement has been integrat1•d, the standard of interpretation of that part
is the same as that applicable to an agreement
which has been wholly integrated. (Restatement,
Contracts, ~232 (1932 ed.))
Apparmtly, defondants have also forgotten their own
position at trial. At the hearing on .January 18, 1967, Mr.
Dufford argned as follows:

MR. DUFFORD: . . . We have no question
at all, had the lawsuit started ten days after that
.J nly 25 memo, that no evidence couid have been
introduced to show that there was an oral term
to that option, contrary to what the written documents said. . . . ( Tr-3, p. 31)

.:\IR. DUFFORD: 'l'hat option agreP11wnt was
that the Larsons, the defendants, would provide
'!'OSCO with a six months option to lease the
mining claims, as consideration for that option;
tht'~' w<>re to pay the Larsons $20,000.00 and as
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stated in tlw initial agn-'1•11H,nt, when thl' fol'mal
documents were signed. But, as l\lr. Larson h•sti
fied his undPrstanding was that en>rybod~- agTf'(•r!
that the option period would commence .July 13th.
So he goes forward on that undPrstanding. J don't
think again that there is an~- qtwstion that hi 0
interpretation of the documents at the font• ther
'vere executed was not correct, hut what did th~·
parties do here.
THE COURT: His intPrpretation is not tlu·
decisiw mattt•r. 'Vas there an option agreernent:
(Tr-3, p. 32)
Defendants' theory is based upon Larson's admittedly
erroneous understanding of the meaning and effect of
the July 25 agreement. The law requires a more ohj~c
tiw test, as the Restatement indicates:
ST AND ARD OF INTI~RPRE'l'A'l'IO;\
WHERE THERE IS INTEGRATION.
The standard of interpretation of an intq:rration, except where it prodtH'PS an ambiguous n·sult, or is excluded by a rule of la"' establishing
a definifr uwaning, is tlw meaning that would lw
attached to tlw intPgration by a reasonabl~- intPlligPnt person acquainted with all operatiw usages
and knowing all the circumstances prior to and
contemporaneous with the making of thP inte~ra
tion, other than oral statements by the parties of
"·hat they intended it to mean. (Restatenwnt,
Contrncts, §230 (1932 ed.))
That the July 25 letter is an integration, not a mere
lPtter of intent, is clear from the definitions supplied by
the Restatement section only partially quoted by defendants. The discnssion immediatPly preceding the language
qnotPd by dPfendants states as follows:
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An agrePlllent is intPgratP<l wlwre the partiPs
tlwrl'to adopt a writing or \\Titings as the final
and complete exprPssion of the agrPement. An
intPgration is tlw writing or writings so adoptPd.

a. IntPgrated contracts must be distingnislwd frolll written memoranda by which contracts may be provPd, and from contracts form<'d
l1y letters or other informal writings the words
ol which hai;e not been assented to by both parties
as a definite and complete expression of their
agreement . ... (Restatement, Contracts, ~228(a)
( 1932 Pd.)) (J~mphasis :mpplied.)
On .Jnl~' :W, 1963, all parties recordPd their assent
to the .J ul~v 25 agrPement as a definite and complete exprrssion of tlw undPrstandings they had reached at that
dak Larson's interpretation of the effect of the July 25
agreement was, as his counsel admitted at trial, simply
incorrect. 'rhat interpretation does not justify the admission of parol \•videncP to vary a term covered by the July
~5 writing and agrePd npon at that time by all the parties
who signed it.
D.

Parol Rvidence is Inadmissible to J' ary the Clear
Terms of the July 25 Agreement.

In both Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc., 10 Utah 2d 53,
348 P.2d 337 (1960) and Farr v. Wasatch Chemical Co.,
105 Utah 272, 143 P.2d 281 (1943), the sole authorities
cited by defendants in their Argument I.C. 3., this court
rejected the offer of parol evidence on thP gronnd that
snch evidence cannot be introduced to vary the clear
tPrms of a writing. In Davis, this court noted that it
might hP possible to show hy parol evidence that both
19

parties entered into a new contraet altering tlw ternu; of
an earlier contract. The issue here, hmn'ver, it-> the interprPtation of an original written contract. In Parr,
both parties relied on oral contracts, and this court fonnd
that the partiPs did entl:'r into an independent oral agreement on tPrms not covPred b? the original writing. In
the instant case, any reasonable reading of the July 25
agreement reveals that the time of the commencement
of the six month option period is clearly covered therein.
At page 30 of their brief, under Argument I.C.4.,
defendants reach the illogical conclusion that nnd1•r
TOSCO's interpretation tlwre was no contractual rt>lationship whatsoever. On July 25, the parties agreed to
the t0rms expressed in the writing of that dak If tlw
$20,000.00 had not been paid, of course Larson would
not be legally bound to execute formal docmnents, a'
agreed in said writing. The fact of this case is that th~
$20,000.00 has been paid, pursuant to that agreement and
Larson's request.

IV. REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT I.D.
Parol Ei:idencc of an All<'ged Oral Contract Contradictory to the July 25 Agreement is Barred l!y t/11'
Statiite of Frauds.
Defendants' statement that the statute of frauds has
no application to an "executed agreement" is wishful
boot-strapping. TlH' cases cited by defendants, Greenwood v. Jackson, 102 Utah 161, 128 P.2d 282 (1942), and
Cutright v. U11io11 Sm:in,r;s & Investment Co., 3:1 etah
486, 94 Pac. 984 (1908), in no wa~- support their stated
proposition. Both casPs dealt w;th th0 doctrine of pnrl
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pirformancc in Utah; both held that parol evidence was
inadmissible to Pstablish parol gifts, in violation of the
statlltl' of frauds; and in both the evidence failed to
t'stahlish sufficient part performance to take the alleged
oral contract out of the statute of frauds. As stated in
plaintiff's brief, detn:mental performance on the part of
tlw party alleging the oral agrerment must be proved in
order to take any oral modification of a contract for intPn'st in land out of the statute of frauds.

The written agreement provides that the six month
option lwriod will commence at some time subsequent to
.Jul~' 25, 19G:J, after certain conditions precedent are satisfied. Defendants claim not only that the six month option
period began before such conditions were satisfied, but
also that it began to run 10 days before the written agreement 'rns even signed. One cannot avoid the statute of
frauds by alleging an "executed" oral contract which is
inconsist<>nt with a subsequent clear and concise writing
sig1wd hy all of the parties.
Y. REPLY TO D:mFENDANTS' ARGUMENT III.

A. Plaintiff is Alternatively Entitled to a New Trial.
Def t>ndants attack 'rOSCO's argument for new trial
\rithont onP citation to appropriate authority. They challenge the application of Nichols v. Whitacre, 112 Mo.
App. 692, 87 S.W. 594, by stating that this case "involved
a jury and the improper instructions was not consistent
"'ith the evidence.'' Defendants' representation to the
trial court that there was a subsequent oral modification
of the contract, upon which they relied, was certainly not
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consistent with the evidence, as plainly shown in Section
III, supra, of this Reply Brief.
Tlw trial conrt stated that it based its judgment
on a subsequent oral modification which avoided the parol
evidence rule and the statute of frauds. ( Tr-3, p. :3C)
On this appeal, defendants claim only that a prior, invalid
oral agret>ment was somehow suhst~qnently "confirmed.''
Yet then• is no e\·idence of subsequent oral modification
or dc>trinwntal reliance. This in itself entitles plaintiff
to a nPw trial, to present evidence rebntting such theories.
Furthermore, it haH been lwld that when facts haVI'
been proved but are not found by the court and are therPf ore deemed unproved, a new trial should be awarded on
the ground of snrprise. Lupton v. Taylor, 39 Ind. App.
412, 78 N.E. GS9 (1906), Gray v. Taylor, 2 Ind. App. 155,
28 N.I~. 220 (1891). Here plaintiff has proved that
'l'OSCO relied not npon any eplwmeral "oral understandings" to guide its conduct, but upon the express terms of
tlw July 25 writing. Such fact was ignored and not fonnd
by the trial court. This silence is ettnivalent to snrpri8l'.
and plaintiff is entitled to a new trial in order to introduce further evidence to support its view of tlw effect of
the July 25 agreement.
Defendants took totally contradictory positions on
various issues during the trial. ThP>. even abandoned
their pleadings and submitted Findings of Fact an<l Conclusions of Law which found that thPre never was a contract. The trial court signed these Findings and Conclusions, only later to discover, at plaintiff's insistence, that
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thi»· did not n'1n·esPnt its ,jnd~mt>nt at all. '!'he confused
aiirl tortuous path of this casP entitlPs plaintiff to a new
trial, wherP evid1•ncP ('an be offered by plaintiff to refute
tlwori1's not in tlw casP at the ontset.

B. Plaintiff is AlternO!tively Entitled to Restitution.
In the ewnt the court rnles that the agreement of
Jnly 25, 1963 is not specifically enforceable, plaintiff
is entitled to restitution of the $20,000 it paid to defendants in rPliance on said contract.
'!'his suit was brought for a declaratory judgment
<lf the rights of the parties under the July 25 agreement.

At the outset of the trial defendants denied the existence
of an~- contract between the parties and admitted that if
tlwir position wPre sustained, they would return the
$~0,000 to TOSCO. No counterclaim or affirmative def Pnse was pleadPd alleging a different agreement. Not
until aftt>r tht:> tt:>stirnony of the witnesses, and after the
eourt reYea!Pd its thPor~' that there was a completed
eontract, did defendants take the position that there had
indeed bPt>n a binding contract between the parties, though
pnrportPdl~- different from the .July 25 agreement. Under
tlw theorit:>s of the casP governing the conduct of the trial,
Pither tht:> .Tuly 25 agreement is a specifically enforceahl!' contract undf'r which plaintiff has performed, or it
is not a s1wcifically Pnforceable contract and plaintiff
il'l <>ntitll•d to r1'stitntion of the sum it gave defendants
in reliance on said agreement.
It may he that both parties took different views of
the legal relationship established by the July 25 agree23

ment. This court could find that Larson believed that
the oral understanding of July 11, 19G3 was not changed
or affected by the new agreement entered into on Jul)·
25, 19G3, and sigm~d b~- Larson on July 2G, even though
said agr<'ement specifically 1irovided that the option
period would not connnPnce until the claims were distributed, the documents signed and the money paid. Plaintiff vigorously contends such position is untenable, and
that all evidence of any such belief is inadmissible to vary
the terms of the signed writing. Nevertheless, this court
might conclude such to be Larson's personal statP of
mind.
Such finding can in no way repudiate the uncontradicted testimony of TOSCO's attorney and chief executive officer, corroborated by 'l'OSCO's actions, that at
no time subsequent to July 25, 1963, did 'l'OSCO heliere
or understand that the option period had begun to run.
Larson's testimony as to what he believes is not evidence
as to what TOSCO belie\·ed. It was TOSCO's position at
trial, just as it has been TOSCO's position in all its
dealings with dt•fendants, that the option period would
not commence until, as provided by the writing of Jnl)·
25, the option and lease documents were signed.
As pointed out in plaintiff's brief, it is basic to contract law that a party acting to its own detriment for the
benefit of another, under a mistaken belief that there
was an agreement between the parties, must be restor~d
to its original position. The following statement from
Section 15, RestatE'ment, Restitution, reflects such principle:
A person is entitled to recov(•r moue~- ·which lie ha~
paid another person nuder tltP h>nns of a snpJJ0' 1'd
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contract with or offer from tlw other which, lwcause of the payor's mistake of fact as to the
PxistPnce of consPnt or consideration, or of a reqnirt>d formality, he erroneously believed to exist,
if lw does not get the expected exchange.
Hen· 'l'OSCO paid $20,000 to defendants in the belief that
they had consented to the writing of July 25 and would
comply therewith by completing the formality of executing the necessary documents granting TOSCO a six
month option. It has not received the expected exchange
and therefore, if not decreed specific performance, is
entitled to restitution.
Defendants speculate that TOSCO chose not to acquire the Larson lands. There is no evidence to support
snch supposition. The agreement on July 25 was to grant
in the future to TOSCO a six month option period in
which to decide whether or not to acquire the Larson
lands. Defendants' statement that TOSCO "obviously"
wantt>d to reduce the cost of its acquisition of the Larson
lands is also unsupported by any evidence. The $20,000 was indeed paid "on the strength of Larson's assnrance that the defendants would execute some kind
of document" (Plaintiff's Brief, pp.12, 28); that was the
basis of the July 25 agreement, as specifically recited
therein, and the basis for all of 'fOSCO'S acts.
TOSCO has consistently taken the position that the
language of the July 25 agreement governed the relationship of the parties. TOSCO is entitled to receive a six
month option, having paid the $20,000 called for in the
Jnly 25 agreement. If TOSCO's position was and is er-
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roneons, its payment of $20,000, based on :,;nch position,
cannot inure to defendants' benefit, whatever Larson's
personal belief might have been.
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